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ARTICLES 
Never Jam To-day: On the Impossibility of 
Takings Jurisprudence 
JEANNE L. SCHROEDER* 
"I'm sure I'll take you with pleasure!" the Queen said. "Twopence a week, 
and jam every other day." 
Alice couldn't help laughing, as she said, "I don't want you to hire 
me-and I don't care for jam." 
"It's very good jam," said the Queen. 
"Well, I don't want any to-day, at any rate." 
"You couldn' t have it if you did want it," the Queen said. "The rule is, jam 
to-morrow and jam yesterday-but never jam to-day." 
"It must come sometimes to 'jam to-day,' "Alice objected. 
"No, it can't," said the Queen. "It's jam every other day: to-day isn't any 
other day, you know." 
"I don't understand you,'' said Alice. "It's dreadfully confusing!" 
"That's the effect of living backwards," the Queen said kindly: "it always 
makes one a little giddy at first-" 1 
The jurisprudence that has developed under the takings prov1s1ons of the 
Fifth2 and Fourteenth3 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution is a top contender 
for the dubious title of "most incoherent area of American law." A LEXIS 
search will produce hundreds of recent articles attempting to reconcile, critique, 
or condemn Supreme Court takings jurisprudence or to justify, reinterpret, or 
re-imagine the underlying theory of property.4 · 
This article will, therefore, spare the reader yet another exegesis of the case 
law of takings. Nor will I survey the literature on takings, if for no other reason 
than that it is so copious that it is impracticable to do so. Nor will I take either 
of the two dominant analytical approaches to takings: (1) the "conservative" 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A somewhat different 
version of this article will be part of a chapter in JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: 
PHILOSOPHIC AND PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES OF THE FEMININE AND PROPERTY (forthcoming 1996) 
[hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES]. I would particularly like to thank David Gray 
Carlson, Jack Williams, and the students of the " Hegel's Logic" Seminar, Cardozo School of Law, 
Spring I 996. 
I. LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in ALICE'S ADVEN-
TURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 145, 210 (1960). 
2. The Takings Clause reads " nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states by incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
4. Presumably, there are many hundreds of earlier articles and notes not available on LEXIS. 
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approach, which accepts some form of traditional property jurisprudence and 
then proposes how to rationalize or reconcile the case law; or (2) the "progres-
sive" approach, which argues for a substantial reconceptualization of property 
concepts on the grounds that the traditional approach is incoherent and/or an 
intolerable barrier to beneficial government regulation. 
What I will do is, first, defend the coherence of the notion of property, the 
necessary role of private property rights in the actualization of human freedom 
and, therefore, the importance of protecting property rights from the govern-
ment. Second, I will show the impossibility of an "objective" test or algorithm 
for when government regulation does or does not constitute a talcing. Property is 
not a natural right but one which can exist only in an organized society. The 
determination of property's boundaries can be made only through pragmatic 
reasoning and will always be a matter of politics. As a result, the Talcings Clause 
cannot alone accomplish the task traditionally assigned to it of serving as the 
bulwark that protects private rights from oppression by the public sphere of the 
state. 
These two viewpoints are consistent because I do not approach property 
analysis from any of the classical liberal schools of political philosophy and 
jurisprudence or from a Marxian-influenced critique associated with many 
critical schools of thought. I adopt a property analysis based on the political 
philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. This analysis explains what classical liberalism 
can identify only as an embarrassing paradox: private property is not itself a 
natural right of man but, nevertheless, is logically necessary for man's essential 
freedom. 5 
In the retroactive logic of the Hegelian dialectic in which-as the White 
Queen put it-we live backwards, it is logically impossible to identify the 
moment at which the quantitative change of a diminution of property rights 
becomes the qualitative change of a destruction of property rights. Therefore, at 
any given moment we can only see that a talcing either has not yet occurred, or 
has always already occurred. It is always jam tomorrow or jam yesterday, but 
never jam today. Consequently, because we cannot rely on logic to identify the 
exact moment when a regulation becomes a talcing, we must turn to pragmatism 
to adopt general standards and prophylactic rules. 
I shall show, however, that this difficulty is not only consistent with, but 
necessary to, Hegel's conception of freedom. The failed encounter of property 
law seen in the dialectics of talcings reflects a general failure and negativity, 
5. I have explicated my interpretation of Hegel at much greater length in a series of other articles. 
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and 
Psychoanalysis, 15 CARDOW L. REv. 805 (1995) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces]; 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 
93 MICH. L. REv. 239 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin 
Territory: Margaret Rodin's Imagery of Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REv. 55 
(1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Virgin Territory]. As set forth in these articles, my analysis is also deeply 
influenced by the psychoanalytic philosophy of Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Zizek. 
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which lies at the heart of subjectivity and law. And yet, it is precisely this 
negativity which opens up room for human freedom to actualize itself by going 
beyond the limit. Freedom cannot be bound by a pre-existing "objective" rule; 
we must always leave space for subjectivity. 
I. HEGELIAN PROPERTY 
Hegelian jurisprudence is not antiliberal, but extraliberal.6 By this I mean that 
Hegel did not reject the principles of classical liberalism. Rather, he started his 
analysis with classical liberalism, but showed that it was incomplete. He agreed 
with liberals that individualism, autonomy, and negative liberty are true, authen-
tic, and fundamental aspects of human nature necessary for the actualization of 
human freedom. 7 He argued, however, that they are not the only true and 
authentic aspects of human nature and, therefore, cannot be the sufficient 
conditions of freedom. 8 
For Hegel, subjectivity-the capacity to bear legal rights--can only be 
achieved in what psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques Lacan called the "Sym-
bolic"-the order of law and language.9 By this I mean that the Hegelian 
6. Hegel's theory of property is set forth in G .W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
(Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT). See also 
Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 5; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
7. This is an article on neo-Hegelian philosophy, not liberalism. I am using "classical liberalism" as 
a catch-all tenn for a variety of political, economic, and jurisprudential philosophies that have 
developed since the eighteenth century and which consider the free-standing, individualistic, atomistic, 
and self-interested aspects of human nature to be either natural, pregiven, essential, or otherwise 
authentic in some significant way. Liberalisms tend to hold that human beings are in some way 
fundamentally deserving of equal dignity and are endowed with some fonns of natural rights . Social 
organization of these essentially atomistic beings is justified typically through some concept of a 
hypothetical social contract entered into in some fonn of a state of nature. Political freedom is usually 
conceptualized as a negative liberty from interference by others, rather than as a positive entitlement to 
something. This is not to suggest that many modem theorists who would identify themselves as 
working within the liberal tradition do not also recognize other values, such as a communitarian or 
social side of human nature, or some concepts of positive freedom. Nevertheless, this crude caricature 
is sufficient for the very limited purposes of this article. 
Because I am using the tenn " liberalism" in the sense of classical liberal philosophy, I will use the 
tenn " progressives" to designate those left-leaning scholars who are often called "liberals" in 
colloquial English. 
8. For example, my colleague Michel Rosenfeld gives an excellent analysis of the similarities 
between and importance of Hegel's and Hobbes's views of human nature. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel 
and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REY. 1199, 1209 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, 
Dialectics of Contract]; see also Alan Ryan, Hegel on Work, Ownership and Citizenship, in THE STATE 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY: STUDIES IN HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 178, 185 (Z.A. Pelcynsk.i ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY] ; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 5, at 852-55. 
9. Lacan, whose psychoanalytic theory is deeply influenced by Hegel's philosophy, divided the 
consciousness into three orders: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. See STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, 
JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO 33 (1983); Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II, in 
JACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY 27, 31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. & Jacqueline Rose 
trans., 1983). I have written about these orders extensively elsewhere. See Schroeder, The Vestal and 
the Fasces , supra note 5; Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 5; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra 
note 5. A complete exegesis is beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes it is sufficient to 
know that the "Symbolic" is the order of law, language, and subjectivity. For an excellent, albeit 
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subject (the legal actor) and law are mutually constituting. It is precisely the 
moment of the institution of law as abstract right (which includes property and 
contract) that is the moment of the creation of legal subjectivity as intersubjectiv-
ity.10 That is, to Hegel, the abstract person in the "state of nature" is not yet a 
"subject" in the jurisprudential sense of a being capable of bearing legal rights 
and being bound by legal duties. The abstract person can only achieve this 
capacity (subjectivity) through relationships with other legal actors (subjects) 
who recognize him as one of their own (hence the term "intersubjectivity"). 
This means that although property does not pre-exist society pursuant to natural 
law, neither is it the mere creature of positive law. 11 Freedom requires property, 
but property and law require each other. Consequently, unlike liberalism, free-
dom also requires society even as it requires autonomy. 
A. THE ABSTRACT PERSON 
As a German scholar working in the early nineteenth century, Hegel started 
his political analysis from the version of liberalism developed by Immanuel 
Kant, 12 rather than from those versions more familiar to American lawyers 
developed by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jeremy 
Bentham. Nevertheless, Hegel is relevant to American jurisprudence because 
these theories all share a belief in the concept that is the starting moment of 
Hegel's critique-the notion of authentic human nature as containing elements 
of autonomy, self-standing individualism, and a natural right to negative liberty. 
Kant serves as an excellent starting point for the critique of liberalism precisely 
because he takes this shared notion of the autonomous individual in the state of 
nature to its logical extreme. 
To oversimplify, Hegel agreed with Kant that the most basic, simplest, and 
most abstract (and, of course, least adequate) notion of what it could mean to be 
a person is the notion of self-consciousness as free will. 13 To be free is to be the 
somewhat simplistic, introduction to Lacan's concepts of orders, see ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES 
LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION ( 1990). 
10. Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 139-40. By " law" I am referring to law as Recht, 
abstract right. Positive law ( Gesetz) is not written until the higher stage of development that Hegel calls 
civil society is reached. See infra note 74. 
I 1. Seyla Benhabib gives an excellent account of the difference between Hegel and liberal social 
contract theory. Essentially, liberal theory presumes a pre-existing individual with the capacity to enter 
into contract. Hegel insists that contract, and hence the ability to be a legal subject capable of contract, 
can only exist in a market society. Seyla Benhabib, Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the 
Significance of Hegel's Abstract Right, in STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 159, 162-70. 
12. Hegel's imperative of abstract personality-" [b]e a person and respect others as persons"-is 
" consciously modelled on Kant's categorical imperative." SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE 
MODERN STATE 137 (1972). One should not assume from this, as Margaret Jane Radin does, that Hegel 
was simply agreeing with Kant as to human nature. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Person-
hood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 971 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhoodj . Rather, as I 
discuss in this article, Hegel started with the Kantian construct as a temporary presupposition as part of 
an argument that the construct is only one true moment in human nature. Consequently, The Philosophy 
of Right should be read as an extended critique of Kant. 
13. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 67-68. 
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means to one's own ends, rather than the means to the ends of another. 14 The 
Kantian construct is a totally negative notion of personhood. To be free means 
not to act under compulsion. This means that in order truly to have free will, the 
person can have no needs, desires, relations, or other pathological characteris-
tics. 15 It also means that pure freedom is totally arbitrary-if the person acted 
for a reason, it would be bound by that reason, and not be free. 16 The person at 
the start is, therefore, a pure negativity. This might initially seem depressing 
because in our society we tend to identify the negative as the opposite of the 
affirmative, and, therefore, as that which is bad. But, as I shall emphasize, the 
Hegelian concept of negativity can be seen as hopeful and, indeed, as the very 
basis of human freedom. The negative and the affirmative require each other. 
Pure negativity becomes not nothing, but, rather, pure potentiality. It is the very 
possibility and, therefore, the ability to grow, create, and love. 
To Hegel, the abstract negative person as free will contains an internal 
contradiction that sets the engine of the dialectic in motion. That is, the 
self-consciousness as free will on the one hand has positive existence, but on 
the other hand has no positive attributes and is pure negativity. 17 As such, even 
though the free will is on one hand an individual, on the other hand, it is 
indistinguishable from all other individuals and, therefore, is not individual. 18 
Moreover, to be truly free the person must be beyond desire, yet, as Hegel 
explained in the Phenomenology of Spirit, self-consciousness as negativity is 
nothing but desire. 19 
B. THE CONCRETE PERSON 
Hegel argued that the abstract person can only overcome this contradiction 
and achieve the initial stage of subjectivity by being recognized as a legal 
subject by a person it recognizes as a legal subject. As I have put it elsewhere, 
to Hegel, subjectivity is intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity.2° For Hegel, 
14. See id. at 67. 
15. See id. at 37-38. 
16. See id. at 48-49. 
17. See id. at 46-49; Alan Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 14 (1991). 
18. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 41-42, 54-55; Brudner, supra note 17, at 
26-28, 229-30. 
19. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 167 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter HEGEL, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT]. That is, as I have just explained, self-consciousness as free will has no 
positive content and can only understand itself in contrast to what it is not. And yet it seeks positive 
affirmation of its existence. This can only come through recognition by another. In other words, Hegel's 
logic is intensely erotic. Self-consciousness is the desperate and unquenchable desire to be desired. 
Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 58-60. 
20. See Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 58. That is, I have just explained how Hegel 
believes that the capacity for legal rights can only be achieved through relationships with, and 
recognition by, other legal actors (i .e., subjectivity is intersubjectivity). As I shall explain in the 
immediately following description of the dialectic of property, Hegel thought that for this process to be 
successful, this interrelationship must be mediated, rather than immediate. This is because the very 
concepts of relationship and recognition require two distinct and separate persons. The concept of 
immediate "relations" requires either that these two persons merge as one, or that one party dominate 
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property serves as this initial mediator. Although this struggle for recognition is 
described as a matter of necessity, this should not suggest that we experience 
this process as one of cold logic.21 According to the reasoning of the dialectic, 
abstract concepts must be manifested or actualized in concrete "actual" form. 
This is one of the meanings of Hegel's (wrongly) notorious assertion that 
" [ w ]hat is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational." 22 If the Kantian 
construct is defined as abstract free will, then, in order for the concept of 
freedom to have "meaning" -i.e., determinate being-it is logically necessary 
that the abstract person become a specific, concrete individual with positive 
existence. Because this can only be achieved through recognition by another, 
the person is driven by an insatiable desire for the other. To Hegel, the search 
for love rules man's universe. 
The struggle for recognition is part of the dialectic of self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness for Hegel is desire .... 
the other. Either of these results destroys what Hegel believes to be the logic of personality-to be 
recognized as a person and to actualize one's freedom. Consequently, as we shall see, in order simul-
taneously to assure mutuality and relationship, while yet preserving the individuality and freedom of 
each person in a relationship, the relationship needs a buffer or "mediator." An analogy is the Christian 
concept that the relationship between God and Man in the state of sin must be mediated by Christ. 
To Hegel, property is one such mediated relationship. In property, the mediator is the owned thing or 
res of property. In philosophic terms, this owned thing is called an object. Consequently, subjectivity is 
intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity. For an extended discussion of the necessity of separation, see 
generally Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5; and for a discussion of the necessity of mediation, 
see generally Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 5. 
21. Of course, to say that it is logically necessary for the free abstract person to actualize its freedom 
in concrete existence sounds like the abstract person is not free at all but bound by necessity. This 
misunderstands the retroactive nature of Hegel's logic. He is considering the concept of the abstract free 
person retroactively from the position of a concrete individual situated in society. He is asking, "How 
did we get here from there?" And he is concluding not that it had to happen this way, but that it must 
have happened this way. 
To use a lurid but vivid example I have used elsewhere, from my standpoint sitting here at my 
computer in the Spring of 1996, it is logically necessary for my parents to have had sexual intercourse 
sometime around September 1953. But what could have been more free and contingent from my 
parents' point of view back then? 
This is why Radin was wrong in accusing Hegel of "assuming away" concrete characteristics in 
positing the abstract person. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 12, at 971-72, 974, 977. 
As I explain elsewhere, see Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 131-33, Hegel does not 
"assume away" any human characteristics. Rather, he "abstracts from" them. By this I mean that he 
presupposes the existence of complex individuals, and then retroactively attempts to derive the logical 
process by which they come into being. 
This is not to suggest that there is no necessity in Hegelian logic. As I shall explain at length, 
according to Hegel's dialectic logic, abstractness or pure potentiality is at another moment identical to 
concreteness or actuality. That is, abstract free will is at one moment th.e same thing as its actualization 
in social life, and concrete social life is at one moment the same thing as its potentiality as abstract free 
will. At another moment, however, potentiality and actuality are totally separate. Moreover, the 
argument that a result is logically required does not necessitate any prediction as to the actual empirical 
result. 
22. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 20. Avineri provides an excellent explanation of 
the meaning of this phrase based on Hegel's concepts of "rationality" and "actuality." See AvINERI, 
supra note 12, at 126-27. 
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Indeed, once it is understood that the aim of desire is the preservation of 
self-consciousness, then it seems logical to conclude, as Hegel does, that 
self-consciousness can only achieve satisfaction in another self-conscious-
ness. If desire seeks to maintain identity, then self-consciousness must seek an 
object which provides it with recognition. And the only object which can 
provide recognition to a self-consciousness is another self-consciousness. 23 
To state it another way, Hegel's analysis of property and subjectivity is 
desperately erotic. Although abstract freedom requires that a person have no 
desires, actualization of freedom requires that a person give way to the desire 
that is the essence of self-consciousness. The problem is that even while the 
abstract person now desperately desires to be recognized by others, the abstract 
person is unrecognizable: being purely negative, it has no identifying character-
istics. 24 This is why I have been referring to the abstract person as "it." To be 
recognized, the abstract person must take on external differentiating characteris-
tics. This takes place through a process that develops into property and law. 
C. PROPERTY 
External characteristics are "objects." An "object" in philosophical discourse 
is anything external to, or differentiated from, the "subject" (in this case, 
abstract personhood). 25 As in the classical liberal jurisprudence reflected in the 
writings of Madison and the other Federalists,26 these potential "objects" of 
23. See Rosenfeld, Dialectics of Contract, supra note 8, at 1220-21. See generally Schroeder, The 
Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 5; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
24. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 70; Brudner, supra note 17, at 19, 38. 
25. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 73-74; Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the 
Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1077, 1164 (1989); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 
50-55 (1972) [hereinafter Schroeder, Subject: Object] . Some critics chide Hegel for adopting a strict 
subject-object distinction. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 12, at 1892-94. One 
should note, however, that at this stage, given the definition of abstract personhood, the subject-object 
distinction is merely a logical truism. Precisely because the abstract person lacks identification with an 
object, it is alien to the object. This would be trite, except for its corollary. The very movement of the 
dialectic will reveal the internal contradiction of the subject-object distinction. Consequently, as the 
person is objectified (by taking on individuating characteristics) and develops first into a legal subject 
and eventually into a complex, concrete individual, the subject-object distinction must, by definition, 
become sublated into a complex, concrete interrelationship. 
26. See John 0 . McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 
U. Cm. L. REv. 49 (1996); John 0 . McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1751 
(1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)); Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, 
supra note 5, at 300-02. Jennifer Nedelsky notes: 
Madison did not . . . have a simple conception of property as land or even material goods. The 
"faculties for acquiring property" emphasized a subtle, nonmaterial dimension of prop-
erty .... Madison's concept of property thus had a modem, sophisticated quality that went far 
beyond the focus on land that we associate with the traditional image of the yeoman farmer. 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISO-
NIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 30 (1990). Nedelsky's interpretation of Madison's notion of property 
is not quite as broad as McGinnis's, however. " While Madison did not use the term property to stand 
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property are not limited to actual physical things such as land and cattle, or even 
intangibles such as debts and intellectual property. They also include whatever 
is necessary for concrete personality: one's body, beliefs, opinions, talents, 
etc.27 
Hegel's analysis makes clear, however, that the Lockean liberal notion of 
property as a natural right of the individual that is prior to society and the law is 
incoherent. 28 Each of the rights of property necessarily presupposes the exis-
tence of others in society and can come to full actualization only in legal 
relationships. Property cannot be a right of a truly abstract autonomous preso-
cial individual, because property requires interrelation and mutual dependence. 
We desire the objects of property not for their own sake, but derivatively as 
means to our true desire-the desire of and for other persons. 
The development of the immediate subject-object relationship (of the owner 
and property), which eventually allows for the mediated subject-subject relation-
ship of mutual recognition, requires three moments which correspond to the 
three traditional property rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation. 29 
1. Possession 
The logical first element of property is possession30 -the identification of an 
identifying characteristic (object) with a specific person (subject). To have 
possession of something is to have "external power over" it so that the will is 
embodied in it.31 It is "man's physical and anthropological capacity to appropri-
ate externality for human purposes." 32 This may at first blush seem individualis-
tic, but it actually requires the existence of others. The person takes possession 
of property so that he can become recognizable by other persons. Possession of 
an object by one person can only be understood in terms of the exclusion of 
others from the same object. 33 That is, the only way to identify an object to this 
person is in terms of not identifying it to that person. This is the familiar 
concept (often associated with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld) that property-like 
all legal rights-can only be understood as a relationship among legal sub-
jects. 34 
for all individual rights (as in the Lockean sense of life, liberty, and estate), the reverse often appears to 
be the case: when Madison spoke of individual rights, it was property he had in mind." Id. at 23. 
27. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 74-75; Benson, supra note 25, at 1164. 
28. For discussions of the antinaturalism of Hegel's theories, see AYINERI, supra note 12, at 132, and 
MEROLD WESTPHAL, HEGEL, FREEDOM AND MODERNITY 3 J (1992). 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 30-53. 
30. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 76-88; Brudner, supra note 17, at 23. 
31. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 76. 
32. Benhabib, supra note 11, at 171 . 
33. "[T]aking possession confers the title of property only if the individual is situated in a context of 
social relations that legitimize this act." Id. at 172. 
34. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 
65-115 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919). Thomas Grey labels the view of property as a bundle of rights the 
"specialist" definition of property used by lawyers as opposed to the lay definition of the thing owned. 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock 
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Although the English word "possession" (and its German cognate used by 
Hegel) carries the unfortunate connotation of immediate physical custody of 
tangible things, Hegelian possession is not so limited. Physical custody is 
merely one possible way to actualize possession. Indeed, because it is the most 
determinate form of possession, it is the most inadequate-a brute fact easily 
defeated by a brute. 35 For possession to serve its function, it must be intelligible 
by others.36 One can possess an object more adequately through "marking" or 
changing it. 37 Elsewhere I have suggested that a more accurate term for 
Hegelian possession might be "objectification. " 38 It is the requirement that a 
claim to property be made "objective" in the sense of intersubjectively recogniz-
able.39 
2. Enjoyment 
Mere possession as identification and exclusion is problematic. The person 
takes possession of objects to establish personality, but mere identification of . 
person with object does not in and of itself enable the person and the observer to 
distinguish between the person (the subject) and the object. The person thereby 
asserts mastery as subject over the object by enjoying it.40 In other words, 
within the dialectic of property, the person does not seek to possess an object in 
order to enjoy it. Rather, the abstract person is driven to possess the object 
because it desires others. It is only upon possession of the object that he (who is 
now in the process of becoming a concrete person) is driven to enjoy it.41 The 
exact manifestation of enjoyment obviously depends on the specific object-
food can be eaten, debts collected, the sensuous pleasures of the body experi-
enced, etc. 
Enjoyment is the most solipsistic element of property in that the subject turns 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter N0M0S XXII]. I have criticized this view on two grounds. 
First, the notion of property as rights was not only not invented by Hohfeld, it is not particularly 
modern. Second, and more importantly, Hohfeld and Grey's definition of property is deficient in that it 
fails to recognize that, although property rights are of course always rights among legal subjects, what 
distinguishes them from other rights is that they relate to the control over objects. Schroeder, 
Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 5, at 271-302. 
35. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 84-85. 
36. See Benson, supra note 25, at 46. 
37. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 85-86. 
38. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 455 
(1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Legal Surrealism]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The 
Myth that the U.C.C. Killed "Property," (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration). 
39. I have called this definition of objectivity as intersubjectivity "Community Objectivity." It is 
found in many disciplines in addition to law, including the philosophy of science. See Schroeder, 
Subject: Object, supra note 25, at 17-24. 
40. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 88-89. 
41. This does not mean that Hegel ignores the empirical fact that people often seek to enjoy objects 
in order to satisfy physical or emotional needs. We all need to eat. Hegel's point is that property 
relations to objects can not be reduced to these sensuous relations. See Schroeder, Bundle-0-Stix, supra 
note 5, at 266-70. 
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inward to the object. Enjoyment is, therefore, inadequate. It is masturbatory: the 
eros of personhood is for social intercourse. Solitary enjoyment also implicitly 
presupposes the existence of others who must be excluded so that the object can 
be enjoyed,42 and who must observe if property is to fulfill its purpose. But 
without mutual recognition, the enjoyer remains virgin and sterile, while the 
observer is reduced to perverse voyeurism. 
The danger of enjoyment is dependence upon the object.43 Rather than being 
the means to his own ends (the definition of freedom), the person risks becom-
ing subjected to the ends of the object. Because the enjoyer only has positive 
existence through enjoyment of his object, he is an addict who is a slave to, and 
lives only for, the object. This is inconsistent with the free nature of the person 
and with the function of property, namely the actualization of that freedom. So 
long as the person remains fascinated by the enjoyment of the object, he cannot 
turn to others. 
These contradictions cannot remain. The person possessed the object in order 
to actualize his freedom by becoming recognizable. In order to establish his 
mastery over the object, he subjected it to his will through enjoyment. But by 
doing so, he became the slave of the object. He must rid himself of the 
enslaving object.44 But if he were to try to free himself by abandoning the 
object, he would lose the identifiability that is necessary for recognition and 
concrete freedom. 
3. Alienation 
The initial contradiction of property is sublated in contract. This is the logical 
first moment when abstract persons are able to recognize each other and become 
legal subjects. The person cannot remain in lonely enjoyment but must extricate 
himself from the trap of objectivity. Simple abandonment of the object is a 
self-defeating retreat back into abstraction and away from recognizability.45 The 
person must, therefore, find a way of untangling himself from the object, while 
simultaneously maintaining sufficient connection to it to remain recognizable. 
This enables him to enter into a relationship of mutual recognition by another 
person. 
Although superior to abandonment, gift is, surprisingly, inadequate to this 
function. True, in gift the donee can recognize the donor as a person with 
identifying characteristics who is indifferent to the object given and is therefore 
free in the sense of being a means to his own ends. The problem is that the 
donee's recognition does not "count." This is because in gift, the donor treats 
the donee as the means to the donor's ends of achieving freedom.46 The donee 
does not herself exercise subjectivity in receiving the gift-she is literally the 
42. See Brudner, supra note 17, at 31-33. 
43. See id. at 31. 
44. See id. at 34. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
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object of the donor's affection. The donor can not requite the donee's love 
precisely because he has selfishly demanded love from her rather than helping 
her become loveable.47 How often have we seen this failed dialectic played out 
in actual "love" affairs? 
Because the donor does not achieve his goal of being recognized by another 
subject, he also fails in achieving the subjectivity he desires. Instead of achiev-
ing the self-other relationship of mutual recognition, the donor remains in a 
subject-object relationship. Moreover after the gift is made (as in abandon-
ment), the giver is once again left without an identifying object in his posses-
sion. He squandered his object in a failed attempt at recognition and is once 
again left unrecognizable. 
D. EXCHANGE 
The only way of making a person loveable is to love her-to recognize her as 
a subject worthy of recognition. In exchange-Le., contract48--one person does 
not give an object to the other; two persons exchange objects.49 Not only is the 
first party thereby recognized as a free subject by the counterparty, the counter-
party is simultaneously recognized as a free subject by the first party because 
the counterparty is also alienating an object. 50 Because in contract the two 
parties are briefly united in a common will-the agreement to engage in the 
47. Although we tend to think of gifts as benevolent, from a Hegelian property analysis they are 
parallel to the malevolent relationship described in Hegel's famous lord-bondsman dialectic. The lord, 
seeking recognition, enslaves a bondsman who is forced to bow down in obeisance. This does not have 
the desired result, however, because the lord has reduced the bondsman to a degraded state. By 
enslaving the bondsman, the lord has refused to recognize the bondsman as an equal human being 
whose judgment counts. Or, to put it the other way, the lord can only maintain his status as a lord by 
refusing to recognize the bondsman as a human being. The recognition by the bondsman is unsatisfying 
precisely because the lord craves admiration from someone better than himself, yet the lord can not 
allow himself to admit that the bondsman is even his equal. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, supra 
note 19, at 114-21. 
Similarly, admiration which is bought-as in the case of gift-is suspect. We despise those who take 
bribes. Consequently, there is something unsatisfying in the recognition of thanks precisely because we 
do not really admire another person when he is thanking. It is a servile act. By demanding love, rather 
than giving it, the donor, like the lord, reduces the donee, like the bondsman, to an inferior position. 
The donee whose love is demanded is perceived as pathetic and clinging, and not loveable. This is why 
the seducer's desire turns to loathing the moment his paramour asks "When will I see you again?" 
This is not to imply, of course, that gifts never have benevolent social functions. Rather, the 
relationship of gift does not further the specific function assigned to property, namely the creation of 
legal subjectivity. 
48. For simplicity, in this article I use the term "contract" to describe its more complete manifesta-
tion in exchange. Hegel, however, was careful to recognize that even gift has a contract aspect. "A 
contract is formal in so far as the two acts of consent whereby the common will comes into being-the 
negative moment of the alienation of a thing ... and the positive moment of its acceptance-are 
performed separately by two contracting parties: this is a contract of gift." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT, supra note 6, at 106. The gift contract is, however, inadequate to the function of mutual 
recognition precisely because the two parties do not both share the two moments of contract. 
49. This is as much the case in services contracts as in sales contracts. The services performed are as 
much an object (in the sense of being separable from the concept of personhood) as the money paid. 
50. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 70. 
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exchange-they share ends.51 Neither is reduced to the subhuman level of a 
mere means to the ends of the other. This is the moment of mutual recognition 
between subjects, a moment that can only be achieved through the mediating 
object in the relationships known as property, contract, and abstract law. 52 
Law is essential to this dialectic because it is through the recognition of rights 
that a person obtains the dignity of a subject. Law (i.e., property and contract) 
and the legal subject who is capable of contract are mutually self-constituting. 
The abstract-person creates rights not so he can immediately claim them for 
himself, but so that he can accord them to the other in order to bestow on her 
the dignity of subjectivity so that she may in turn recognize him and return the 
gift of subjectivity.53 
E. SUBLATION 
Unlike liberal philosophers, Hegel does not stop with the recogrutton of 
individualistic subjectivity and the negative liberty of property rights. I have 
been describing the Hegelian dialectic in terms of desire and love, but the 
relationship achieved at the level of abstract right is only the cold impersonality 
of the marketplace. As its name suggests, abstract right is the most abstract, and 
therefore the least adequate, form of human relationships.54 Consequently, it is 
only the first necessary step in, and not the culmination of, the development of 
the personality and the actualization of freedom. This is why the last two-thirds 
of Hegel's The Philosophy of Right concern how abstract right is sublated into 
the more adequate relationships of morality, which in turn is sublated into 
ethical life, thereby enabling the development of a complex individuality within 
a complex society. This means that, in contrast to utilitarian liberalism, Hegelian-
ism refuses to analyze all human relations in terms of economic man interacting 
in the marketplace. 55 This also means that, in contrast to the dictates of 
libertarian liberalism, property rights cannot be absolute. Property rights will be 
necessarily limited not only by property's own internal limitations, but by the 
higher requirements of morality and ethics.56 
51. See id. at 102-03. 
52. See id. at 104-05. 
53. As Hegel said: 
If someone is interested only in his formal right, this may be pure stubbornness, such as is 
often encountered in emotionally limited people . . . ; for uncultured people insist most 
strongly on their rights, whereas those of nobler mind seek to discover what other aspects 
there are to the matter . .. in question. 
Id. at 69. 
54. Brudner describes the relationship of contract as "the distorted image peculiar to persons who 
define their worth independently of all connection to others." Brudner, supra note 17, at 37. 
55. See Av1NERJ, supra note 12, at 139. Indeed, to describe more complex relationships, such as 
marriage, in terms of contract is not just impossible; it is "disgraceful." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 
supra note 6, at 105. 
56. As I discuss elsewhere, property is limited internally by its own logic, as well as externally by 
positive law. Because the logic of property is mutual recognition, those minimal "objects" which are 
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Nevertheless, it is a common, but serious, misreading of Hegel to assume that 
the fully developed Hegelian state can abrogate private property rights or 
private markets to serve other purposes (as in contractarian and egalitarian 
liberalism). Nor can the person lose his individuality and autonomy when he 
becomes a citizen of a Hegelian state. One cannot understand Hegelian theory 
without first grasping the dialectical process of "Aujhebung," which is usually 
inadequately translated into English as "sublation. " 57 I will discuss sublation in 
detail later in this article when I argue that sublation describes the process that 
takes place when a regulation becomes a "taking. " 58 At this stage, let me 
emphasize that sublation is not an evolutionary concept like survival of the 
fittest. The logically more primitive moments in the development of a notion are 
not replaced by the logically more advanced. Sublation is the process by which 
an earlier moment is preserved even as it is negated. Each moment of a concept 
is a true, authentic, and necessary moment which must always remain in 
existence. Each earlier stage contains the possibility of the next stage, and each 
later stage is the actualization of the earlier one. 
F. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITATION ON PROPERTY 
We are now ready to pose the principal question of this article: If moral and 
ethical considerations require the limitation of property, but the dialectic logic 
of sublation demands that property be preserved, what degree of limitation of 
property is consistent with and necessary for the actualization of human free-
dom? This Hegelian question is identical to the liberal question of how to 
interpret the Takings Clause. 
Hegel's answer is unfortunately, but inevitably, disappointing to the tradi-
tional consumer of law review articles. Logic can prove why it is necessary to 
make this distinction between permissible limitations of property rights and 
impermissible takings, but it cannot develop an algorithmic test that can locate 
the line dividing the two. This determination can be made only through prag-
matic, rather than logical, reasoning and can only be established through 
positive law. 59 Such pragmatic reasoning and positive legislation falls precisely 
necessary for recognizability-such as our personality and beliefs-must remain inalienable. This is 
why slavery is an abstract wrong. See Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 140-49; see also 
Brudner, supra note 17, at 35-47; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Hegel's Subjects, Blackstone 's Objects and 
Hohfeld 's Ghosts: A Comment on Russell 's Imagery of Slave Auctions, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1996). I discuss the necessity that the restrictions of positive law on property be limited in infra 
text. See also WESTPHAL, supra note 28, at 29, 32; Brudner, supra note 17, at 42-47. 
57. I say inadequate because this obscure English term is not used in colloquial English and does not 
have the rich implications o.f the German. Although borrowed from chemistry, I have never seen it used 
in any context except in discussions of Hegelian influenced philosophy. 
58. See infra text accompanying notes 117-31. 
59. Hegel "did not dream of dictating to us ... the resolution of conflicts between the individual and 
society. Hegel's theory leaves us free to resolve these issues for ourselves." Richard Hyland, Hegel: A 
User 's Manual, 10 CAROOZO L. REv. 1735, 1742 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
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in the realm that liberalism calls "mere" politics.60 Consequently, Hegel agrees 
with liberals that a limitation on governmental "takings" of property is neces-
sary for freedom and a just society. In contradistinction to classical liberalism, 
however, Hegelian political theory does not expect takings law to serve as the 
boundary between law and politics, the public and the private. To understand 
why this is so, one must turn to Hegel's concepts of quality and quantity as 
developed _in llis Science of Logic.61 
In the next section, I discuss in greater detail the liberal dilemma of takings 
law. I then show how Hegel's logic explains, but cannot solve, this quandary. 
Finally, I end with a consideration of how the takings dilemma reflects the 
Hegelian-Lacanian paradox of freedom. 
II. THE LIBERAL DILEMMA OF TAKINGS LAW 
A. PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Clearly, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution thought that private property 
was essential to human liberty, or they would not have given it such extraordi-
nary protection. As Jennifer Nedelsky explains, the Takings Clause was to stand 
as a barrier between politics and law, between the public and the private.62 This 
is why Charles Reich in the 1960s thought he could protect welfare recipients · 
from the capriciousness of the government by redefining their entitlements as 
"new property." 63 
The traditional role of property as the bastion of private rights against the 
60. David G. Carlson, Liberal Philosophy's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law, 62 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 257, 268-73 (1993). 
61. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter HEGEL'S 
LOGIC]. This work is sometimes referred to as The Greater Logic. 
62. 
The idea of boundaries and of a sharp distinction between law and politics has been central to 
the American conception of limited government. Property was for 150 years the quintessen-
tial instance of rights as boundaries. It has been the symbol and source of a protected sphere 
into which the state cannot enter. 
NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 8; see also Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. 
L. REv: 1393, 1409 (1991) ("Therefore a concept of property is necessary to render the Constitution an 
effective safeguard against excessive governmental interference with individual life."). 
63. "The institution called property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the 
state." Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). 
Even a critic of traditional property notions such as Thomas Grey admits its traditional "sanctity" in 
our society. See Grey, supra note 34, at 81. Nedelsky, who is also critical of the continuing viability of 
traditional property concepts, correctly identifies property as being "mythical" in the affirmative sense 
of that term. NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 8-9, 224-25. A myth is a story that a society tells in order to 
explain itself. As such, a myth claims a truth that transcends empirical actuality. This is why other 
progressives who are critical of traditional property jurisprudence nevertheless wish to harness proper-
ty's inspirational power for nontraditional purposes by redefining property rights. See infra text 
accompanying notes 92-98. 
Of course, Nedelsky is also using the term "myth" in its pejorative sense, that is, as empirically 
inaccurate and, therefore, false and potentially misleading. 
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onslaught of the public is most consistent with the Lockean liberalism of the 
Federalists. If property is a, or even the, natural or fundamental right of man, 
and if man entered into the social contract in order to protect his natural rights, 
then, by definition, a government must protect private property rights to be 
legitimate. The jurisprudential and political problem this raises is obvious: 
virtually all government regulation directly or indirectly affects property. 
This becomes even more problematic when one reads into the Takings Clause 
the Madisonian definition of property, which included not only rights with 
respect to material things (such as land and cattle) and intangibles (such as debts 
and intellectual property) but also things that fall within the philosophical 
concept of "objects" such as our bodies and minds (i.e., our talents, opinions, 
religion, speech, etc.).64 Richard Epstein65 and Robert Nozick66 are no doubt 
correct that, if one were to adopt this extreme version of the Libertarian view of 
property, only the most minimalist state could be justified. 
Classical liberalism, broadly understood, is by far the dominant political 
philosophy in this country, but radical libertarians, who believe that virtually all 
government regulations constitute takings, are certainly in the minority. But to 
every other school of liberalism, takings jurisprudence raises a paradox. It is 
possible to take a more moderate Lockean approach which recognizes property 
as one, but not necessarily the only, right (natural or otherwise) that government 
should protect. But then, how can one balance between competing natural rights 
and fundamental interests? Contractarians, such as Hobbes, argued that in order 
to stop the war of all against all, man submitted himself to the unlimited power 
of the absolute sovereign who grants entitlements-known as property-to 
citizens.67 How, then, can we reconcile a constitutional provision that seeks to 
rein in the sovereign 's power over property when, by definition, the social 
contract has ceded absolute power over property to the sovereign? Utilitarian-
ism protects property instrumentally as a means of achieving the greatest 
happiness for society as a whole.68 Should not the government then have some 
constitutional power to rearrange property entitlements if thi_s would further the 
greater good? But how do we reconcile this notion with the utilitarian instinct 
that the best way to ensure utility (or wealth) maximization for society generally 
is to permit each individual member to maximize his own utility (or wealth) in 
64. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
65. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985). 
66. Nozick recognizes a natural right of property established by appropriation (either by the owner, 
or by transfer from a legitimate owner). See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53, 
174-82 (1974). He then asks what vision of the state is consistent with these rights. " So strong and 
far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials 
may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the state?" Id. at ix. 
67. Once again, these descriptions of various schools of liberalism might be so simple as to border 
on caricature, but they are sufficient for the limited use to which I am putting them. For an excellent 
concise description of Hobbesian contractarianism, see Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The 
Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REY. 769, 790 
(1985). 
68. See, e.g., id. at 798-802. 
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the marketplace? An egalitarian liberal might also argue that some limitations 
on the property rights of the most wealthy citizens are constitutionally justified 
in the name of distributive justice.69 On the other hand, an egalitarian liberal 
might simultaneously recognize that the government's right to take property 
must be limited because it can easily devolve into an unequal and, therefore, 
unjust, tax levied against a targeted individual, rather than against similarly 
situated people generally.70 
In any event, our Constitution expressly protects property from uncompen-
sated takings by the government. Moreover, all of the major schools of liberal-
ism recognize some fundamental liberty interest in property-either as a natural 
right or as a right necessarily created by positive law to protect other natural 
rights such as autonomy, the pursuit of happiness, or equality. Yet all but the 
most extreme libertarians also recognize other fundamental interests that justify 
at least some governmental limitation of property interests. This raises obvious 
line drawing problems: when does government regulation so interfere with 
property rights that the property has been taken? 
Inevitably, takings jurisprudence requires that we draw some line between 
takings and legitimate exercises of the state's police power. The need to draw 
lines does not, however, in and of itself make takings jurisprudence uniquely 
difficult. Law requires us to draw lines all the time. We typically do this through 
positive law-whether formally adopted by the legislature, promulgated through 
case law, or developed informally through custom and practice. The uniqueness 
arises because the Takings Clause is supposed to be the vital barrier between the 
69. My colleague Michel Rosenfeld describes egalitarian liberalism, as conceived by Thomas Nagel, 
as assuming that 
there is "moral equality between persons," and that each person has "an equal claim to actual 
or possible advantages." Moreover, besides being on the main forward-looking, egalitarian-
ism "establishes an order of priority among needs, and gives preference to the most urgent." 
Further, Nagel emphasizes that "the essential feature of an egalitarian priority system is that 
it counts improvements to the welfare of the worst off as more urgent than improvements to 
the welfare of the better off." 
MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 
116 (1991) (quoting THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1970)) (citations omitted). 
70. This is Frank Michelman's explanation of the justifiable purpose of a Takings Clause. If the 
government wishes to create a public park, it is justifiable to tax all citizens, or even all wealthy citizens 
and no poor citizens. But it is unjust to make one individual pay the lion's share of the cost of the park 
through forfeiture of his land, while other· individuals of similar wealth are not required to contribute in 
similar ways through taxation. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 1165 (1967). The Supreme 
Court has adopted this as a justification for the Takings Clause. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that Fifth Amendment's guarantee is "designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole."). 
Interestingly enough, as is often the case, this theory, which was developed to further a progressive 
political agenda, has been co-opted to serve other purposes. Egalitarian-type arguments are currently 
being used by supporters of legislation that would define certain pollution control requirements as 
takings. 
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public and the private. Under liberal jurisprudence, however, the usual devices 
of positive law would seem inept for this task precisely because the Constitution 
is supposed to be above politics and positive law. 
The chaotic state of the case law on takings jurisprudence suggests that the 
Supreme Court has so far been unable to do so. Commentators love to feast 
upon the irrationalities and inconsistencies of the precedents, and decry either 
the over-solicitousness toward vested interests or inattention to fundamental 
rights in one or another specific decision. Few critics, however, have ventured 
to offer a resolution. 
B. THE SUPPOSED DISINTEGRATION OF PROPERTY 
As a result, some critics have concluded that the very concept of property and 
the prohibition on uncompensated takings are so internally incoherent that they 
are disintegrating before our very eyes.71 This conclusion is based on two 
observations. 
First, the liberal justification for the protection of property in the Constitution 
is, as we have seen, that private property is a right that is either natural in and of 
itself or fundamental in the sense of being necessary for the protection of other 
natural rights, such as autonomy, the pursuit of happiness, or, to a more limited 
degree, equality. As such, the Constitution assigns a barrier function to property. 
Yet, property is also a legal right that only exists insofar as it is enforceable in a 
court. Specific property rights are often not merely delimited, but created, by 
positive law. For example, copyright is a relatively modern creature of legisla-
tion. Critics like Nedelsky ask: how can property both be a natural right and a 
right created by positive law?72 If it is a right created by positive law, how can it 
serve as a limitation on the government's power to adopt positive laws reducing 
property rights?73 
71. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 34, at 74. 
72. Nedelsky states that " (p)roperty has also carried with it the paradox of self-limiting government: 
it is the limit to the state; it is also the creature of the state. In property, the state sets its own limits." 
NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 8. "It is now widely accepted that property is not a limit to legitimate · 
governmental action, but a primary subject of it." Id. at 231 . 
Nedelsky continues: 
If property is not a "thing," not a special entity, not a sacred right, but a bundle of legal 
entitlements subject, like any other, to rational manipulation and distribution in accordance 
with some vision of public policy, then it can serve neither a real nor a symbolic function as 
boundary between individual rights and governmental authority. Property must have a special 
nature to serve as a limit to the democratic claims of legislative power. 
Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). 
73. 
In more general terms, how can government simultaneously be responsible for establishing 
the property rights of the citizenry and also be entrusted not to render its constituents helpless 
when conditions dictate defining property rights so as to benefit public officialdom? In 
property theory, this might be called the problem of positivism. 
Paul, supra note 62, at 1411. 
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As we have seen, to a Hegelian, the first question is not a philosophical 
problem although, as we shall discuss, the second remains intractable as a 
logical matter. Freedom does not consist of the recognition of natural rights of 
the autonomous individual which theoretically exist prior to society in a hypoth-
esized state of nature. Freedom can only be actualized within society. Property 
is a stage in this process of actualization. On the one hand, property is by 
definition necessarily both artificial, in the sense of a human creation, and 
fundamental, in the sense of necessary for freedom. On the other hand, although 
property is not a natural right, it is not merely a creation of positive law. Hegel 
thought that property and law, in the sense of abstract right, are mutually 
constituting. Abstract right consists of the recognition of human subjectivity 
through the regime of property, and the regime of property requires that it be 
recognized as an abstract right. 
But, at this level, property as a right is only abstract. As possibility, it must be 
actualized in specific, concrete manifestations. It is these concrete manifesta-
tions that are recognized and delineated by positive law (Gesetz) established by 
the civil society and state based on morality and ethical life.74 This leads us to 
the second internal liberal critique of property and takings. 
C. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS DIVERSITY OF PROPERTY 
As a matter of empirical fact, property can consist of a seemingly bewildering 
variety of rights. For example, even though we colloquially say that an owner of 
a fee simple absolute estate in realty has unlimited rights of possession, 
enjoyment, and alienation of the object of her property, every lawyer knows that 
these rights are in fact limited: at a minimum, her right of continued possession 
may be subject to the state's taxation power, her right of enjoyment is subject to 
nuisance restrictions, and her right of alienation is limited by antidiscrimination 
laws. In practice, most owners' rights are even more restricted by, for example, 
easements (which restrict the right of possession) and zoning regulations (which 
can restrict the rights of enjoyment and alienation).75 
How, critics ask, can we speak of "property" as an identifiable set of rights 
when we recognize such variant combinations of rights as property?76 The 
Hegelian replies that we can-so long as we stay at the appropriate level of 
generality. It does not follow from the proposition that in order for property to 
serve its philosophical function it must reflect the abstract elements of posses-
74. Hegel discusses the process whereby abstract right is first determined as positive law (Gesetz, in 
German) in his discussion of civil society (roughly, the market economy) which is, in tum, part of his 
discussion of ethical life. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 240-61. . 
75 . For an excellent discussion of the restrictions placed on "fee simple absolute," see Stewart E. 
Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55 ( 1987). 
76. In a typical example, Lawrence Becker comes up with a list of 13 different property rights. He 
would recognize as property an interest which has one of the first eight rights he lists plus "security." 
Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII, supra note 34, at 186, 
190-92. Similarly, Grey bases his critique, in part, on the multiplicity he sees in the possible definitions 
of the word "property." Grey, supra note 34, at 70-71. 
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sion, enjoyment, and alienation of an external object that all empirical actualiza-
tion of property must be full, complete, or perfect. If one grasps that the 
Hegelian notion of the elements of property is to be understood at the highest 
level of abstraction, then one can see that these elements can be actualized in a 
dizzying array of concrete manifestations. Nevertheless, all of those legal 
relations that we traditionally recognize as falling within the rubric of "prop-
erty" should contain some form of each of the three elements. The more 
adequate the manifestations of the three elements of property, the more likely 
we will label the right "ownership. " 77 If the manifestations are not as adequate, 
we are likely to give a different label to_ the right. 
A simple illustration can be seen in the mirror image rights of a debtor and a 
secured party under a simple hypothecation of a good. Both the debtor and 
secured party are considered to have property rights in the collateral. Although 
we tend to say that the debtor "owns" the collateral subject to the secured 
party's security interest, our society could just as easily say that the secured 
party "owns" the collateral subject to the debtor's equity interest. Indeed, this is 
how we traditionally describe the relative property rights of the debtor and the 
secured creditor in those states which recognize deeds of trust (rather than 
mortgages) in realty.78 
In a hypothecation, the debtor has the immediate rights of possession (in the 
sense of physical custody) and enjoyment, but both rights are conditioned on 
her continued performance of her obligations under the security agreement. 79 
Frequently, under the terms of the security agreement the debtor does not have 
the present "right" (in the Hohfeldian sense)80 to alienate either her equity 
interest or the secured party's security interest in the collateral. She does, 
however, have a right of alienation conditioned on the payment of the secured 
obligation.81 Nevertheless, in many cases the debtor has the present "power" 
(in the Hohfeldian sense)82 to alienate these property rights and thereby cut off 
the rights of the secured party in the collateral.83 The secured party's property 
rights are the exact opposite. He does not have immediate rights of custody, 84 
77. It is common to speak of fee simple absolute as being the most complete property right in realty. 
This may be true as an empirical matter, but not as a theoretical one. Only the sovereign has the highest 
unlimited allodial estate. 
78. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 670 n.17 (3d ed. 1993). 
79. This is in contradistinction to a pledge, in which physical custody of the collateral is given to the 
secured party. In my example, the secured party 's right to take possession arises upon the debtor's 
default. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1992). 
80. See HoHFELD, supra note 34, at 36-38. 
81. This is true in the sense that after the secured obligation is performed, the security interest of the 
secured party is extinguished. This means that all property rights held by the secured party revert back 
to the debtor. 
82. See H0HFELD, supra note 34, at 50-60. 
83. See, e.g., the "negotiability" rules of U.C.C. §§ 9-307, 308, 310 (1992). 
84. I have argued extensively elsewhere that, in order to be enforceable against others, a claim to a 
property right must also have an immediate possessory element. However, by possession, a Hegelian is 
not speaking of actual or vicarious physical custody of tangible things. Rather, I mean what I have 
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enjoyment, or alienation, but inchoate future rights conditioned on the debtor's 
default. 85 And, even then, the secured party's rights of possession in the sense of 
"repossession," enjoyment, in the sense of collection or strict foreclosure, and 
alienation, in the sense of foreclosure sale, are strictly limited by the procedural 
and substantive rules of the remedies section of Article 9 of the U.C.C.86 
The subtleties of these rights become even more apparent when one tries to 
determine how the rights of a secured party differ from the similar rights of a 
lessor.87 In other words, we can simultaneously require as a matter of jurispruden-
tial "logic" that in order for a legal interest to be recognized as property (in the 
sense of being generally enforceable against third parties) it must contain the 
three traditional abstract elements of property, while also recognizing that there 
is great variety in empirical property rights. 
D. RIGHTS CHOPPING 
The conclusion that the abstract jurisprudential concept of property is inter-
nally coherent as a theoretical matter within Hegelian jurisprudence begs, rather 
than answers, the practical question posed by the Takings Clause. One approach 
to this Hegelian analysis is the superlibertarian position shared by Epstein and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, which Margaret Jane Radin critiques under the awk-
ward name "conceptual severance." 88 Believing that short and common Anglo-
Saxon words are better than complicated septasyllabic, latinate neologisms, I 
will act on a suggestion made by Frank Michelman and call this process "rights 
chopping." 89 A rights chopping analysis recognizes that the historical takings 
rule embraced in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,90 which 
called elsewhere "objectification" -the requirement that the interest be intersubjectively recognizable 
by the class of subjects against whom the property claim is to be asserted. This flows from the 
"purpose" of property, which is ultimately recognition by others. I would analyze the perfection 
requirements of Article 9 of the U.C.C. in terms of the Hegelian "possession" or objectification 
requirement. See generally Schroeder, Legal Surrealism, supra note 38. 
85. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1992). In a pledge, the collateral is in the secured party's possession, but the 
secured party's rights to use and alienate are limited by U.C.C. § 9-207 and, often, by the terms of the 
security agreement. 
86. U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (1992). 
87. This is probably one of the most litigated provisions under Article 9 of the U.C.C. as well as the 
source of parallel disputes under tax Jaw and accounting practices. The distinction identified by U.C.C. 
§ 1-201(37) is that if, after the performance of the obligation by the debtor-lessor, the object subject to 
the property right has any residual value, then (i) the transaction is a security agreement and the obligor 
is a debtor if the obligor obtains the right to possess, enjoy, and alienate the object; and (ii) the 
transaction is a lease and the obligor is a Jessee if the obligee (i.e., lessor) obtains the right to possess, 
enjoy, and alienate the object. 
88. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence 
of Takings, 88 CouJM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1977) [hereinafter Radin, Cross Currents]. To be slightly 
more accurate, Radin does not maintain that Chief Justice Rehnquist has been caught embracing 
conceptual severance, but that he flirts with it in some of his opinions. 
89. Actually, Michelman calls it "entitlement chopping." Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1601 (1988). But as long as I've got the axe out, I'll cut the four syllable word 
"entitlement" down to size as well . 
90. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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holds that a taking is most readily found when there is "permanent physical 
invasion of real property" is inadequate: this rule identifies property too closely 
with one element of possession, and the rule limits possession to only one of its 
many possible manifestations-physical custody of tangible objects. If interfer-
ence with the element of possession is a taking, then regulations that interfere 
with either of the elements of enjoyment or alienation should also be takings. 
This is consistent with a Hegelian analysis. 
Superlibertarians such as Richard Epstein would no doubt argue from this 
that, since property necessarily consists of manifestations of the three abstract 
Hegelian elements, any attempt to chop off any piece of any element in and of 
itself is a taking. That is, any curtailment of any empirical manifestation of any 
of the three abstract elements is, by definition, an interference with property 
rights and, therefore, a taking. This means that virtually all government regula-
tions become per se takings. If one adopts the libertarian proposition that 
property is a natural right, then only the most minimal form of government can 
be justified. 
Radin suggests that the result that flows from the superlibertarian reading is 
so absurd as to demonstrate the fallaciousness, not the power, of the chopping 
argument.91 I agree. Indeed, because the superlibertarian approach comes close 
to including everything under the rubric "property," it threatens to deprive 
property of its analytical power as a separate, distinguishable legal category. 
But this critique can easily suggest an opposite, equally fallacious, conclusion 
from the Hegelian argument. If property rights can be actualized in any number 
of empirical variations, can not we declare that a claimant still has "property" 
and has not been subject to a taking no matter how much of her empirical rights 
we chop away, so long as we leave her with de minimis stubs of the three 
abstract elements? This would, obviously, give the government great power to 
regulate freely without compensating persons whose property is merely dimin-
ished but not totally destroyed. Of course, the problem with this theory is the 
mirror image of the superlibertarian error: both arguments so expand the 
concept of minimum property that they rob it of analytical value. 
Consequently, some progressive critics reflect back the mirror image of 
Epsteinian libertarianism which results in the opposite conclusion. By this I 
mean that they implicitly agree that a traditionally expansive approach toward 
property and the Takings Clause would make much, if not most, legislation 
problematic. But, because they favor more governmental regulation and/or 
redistribution of wealth to further what they see as fundamental interests, 
they argue that this demonstrates that the traditionalist approach toward prop-
erty cannot be supported. Some of these critics, most notably Grey and Nedel-
sky, argue that this is related to a more general societal realization that the 
traditional liberal notion of property has disintegrated92 or was a myth all 
91. See Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 88, at 1674-78. 
92. See Grey, supra note 34, at 74. 
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along,93 in the pejorative sense of that term. They identify as a crucial paradox 
of liberalism the theory that property is a natural right that exists prior to law 
and politics, and the realization that property, as a legal right, can only be 
defined and enforced by the positive law of an organized society. As such, 
modem property may be too ephemeral and too contradictory to continue to 
have property's traditional inspirational role in our society, let alone serve its 
assigned role under the Constitution as a barrier between law and politics. 
Still other progressives wish to preserve the traditional inspirational rhetoric 
of property yet redirect it to other more "progressive" purposes. This requires 
an attempt to redefine property. Prominent examples of such approaches are 
those of Singer, who would base property rights on reliance interests and the 
relative power and dependence of rival claimants,94 and Radin, who would 
divide the potential objects of property into "personal property," which is held 
for enjoyment, and "fungible property," which is held for economic purposes.95 
These new conceptualizations of property require corresponding reconceptual-
izations of the purpose of the Takings Clause. For example, Michelman argues 
that the Takings Clause is designed to prevent the state from unjustly imposing 
on individuals tax burdens that are not generally imposed on all other similarly 
situated persons.96 Radin thinks that the Constitution should be read as a whole 
to further "human flourishing. " 97 Therefore, she argues that the degree of 
constitutional protection for specific property rights should depend on the 
degree to which that property right furthers human flourishing; consequently, 
more protection should be given to personal property and less protection should 
be given to fungible property. Since these approaches undermine both the 
fundamental nature of the right of property--:-treating property instrumentally as 
a means to serve other ends-and, by extension, the barrier function of the 
Takings Clause, they also ameliorate the jurisprudential problem of developing 
a strictly logical or "objective" definition of property and takings. Conse-
quently, Singer and Radin are both self-described "pragmatists" who advocate 
that courts use a situated, context intense, case-by-case approach in deciding 
legal issues.98 
93. 
How can "the tradition" be characterized by both coherence and endurance and by an 
apparently unlimited mutability in the purported core of the structure? The paradox itself 
suggests the answers: it is the myth of property-its rhetorical power combined with the 
illusory nature of the image of property-that has been crucial to our system. And it is this 
mythic quality that current changes in the concept may threaten. 
NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 224. 
94. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 61 I (1988). 
95. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 12, at 959-60; Radin, Cross Currents, supra 
note 88, at 1687-92. I critique Radin's property extensively in Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
96. See supra note 70. 
97. Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 88, at 1687-88. 
98. See Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. 
REv. 409 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 
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E. METONYMY 
An interesting variation of this critique has recently been offered by Louise 
Halper.99 She upbraids Justice Scalia for his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Counci/100 in which the Supreme Court held that the diminution of 
value of property can constitute a taking. She characterizes this as a me-
tonymy. 101 In her words, Justice Scalia is confusing a part-value-for the 
whole-the land. 102 
I agree that this is indeed a metonymic trope, but not the one Halper 
identifies. The whole of property can never be the land itself. Although, in 
colloquial English, we often speak of our land as being our property, from a 
legal standpoint, our property must instead be understood as the set of rights of 
one legal subject enforceable against other legal subjects with respect to the 
possession, enjoyment, and alienation of an object. That is, land is merely the 
object of a property claim. Consequently, the metonymy that Scalia did, in fact, 
use was to substitute one of the three elements of property-enjoyment mani-
fested in the form of the right to development for ·monetary purposes-for the 
whole ofproperty. 
Nevertheless, whatever the form of the metonymy, Halper's argument is that 
one does not destroy the whole of property by merely interfering with its parts. 
The libertarian should (correctly) reply that since property is by definition a 
collection of rights, the only way to destroy property is by destroying its parts. 
(1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856-83 (1987); Joseph 
W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 731 (1990); Joseph W. Singer, Property 
and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 
S. CAL. L. REv. 1821 (1990); Joseph W. Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1752 (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989); ELIZABETH V. 
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMEN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT ( 1989)). 
99. Louise A. Halper, Tropes of Anxiety and Desire: Metaphor and Metonymy in the Law of Takings, 
8 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 31 (1996). 
100. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
IOI. Halper, supra note 99, at 41-42, 46. Specifically, it is a synecdoche. A metonymy is the 
substitution of an attribute of a thing for the thing. A synecdoche is a subset of metonymy-a part for 
the whole. Halper, like me, is influenced by Lacan, who thought that all linguistic meaning consists of 
the slippage of meaning of metaphor and metonymy. Although the example he gives of a metonymy is 
arguably a synecdoche, see JACQUES LACAN, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason 
Since Freud, in ECRJTS 146, 156 (Alain Sheridan trans. , 1977) (1966), it is clear from his analysis that 
he is not so limiting his definition. Lacan thought of metonymy as a substitute of "word-to-word," as 
opposed to metaphor, which is the substitution of "one word for another." Id. at 157. For a good 
introduction to Lacan 's concepts of metaphor and metonymy, see JEAN-Luc NANCY & PHILLIPE 
LACOUE-LABARTHE, THE liTLE OF THE LETTER: A READING OF LACAN 71-76, 96-97, 139-40 (F. Raffoul 
& D. Pettigrew trans., 1992). 
Lacau identified metaphor with the masculine and metonymy with the feminine. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that the Hegelian element of enjoyment of property reflects the Lacanian psychoanalytic concept 
of feminine jouissance. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 5, at 914-17; Schroeder, 
Virgin Territory, supra note 5, at 165-68. It is, therefore, interesting from a Lacanian viewpoint that 
Scalia adopts the feminine trope-metonymy-to find that interference with the feminine element of 
property-enjoyment-is a taking. 
102. Halper, supra note 99, at 41-42, 46, 51-54. 
1554 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 84:1531 
Indeed, if property logically requires the three classic elements, the destruction 
of any one of the three elements by definition destroys the status of a claim as 
property. 
Where does this leave takings law? Unless we limit takings to complete, 
100% deprivations of all property rights, are not we stuck with what Halper 
calls a "metonymic" approach (a taking of some part will be treated as legally 
equivalent to the taking of the whole)? But does not this devolve into the 
libertarian argument which forbids virtually all government regulation? 
To put it another way, how can I argue (as I have elsewhere) 103 that property 
is not a random or arbitrary collection of disparate rights (as the "bundle of 
sticks" metaphor implies), but a recognizable combination of rights, yet at the 
same time acknowledge that it is intuitively and empirically wrong to say that a 
property interest is always destroyed if any one of the rights that comprise 
property is infringed? I believe that these statements are not incompatible for 
the same reason that a beach is still a beach after one removes one grain of sand. 
Nonetheless, as anyone with shore-front property knows, as the sea keeps 
removing grains of sand year after year, the beach will eventually disappear. 
Although property consists of identifiable elements, it is itself an identifiable 
quality which cannot be reduced to a collection of elements. 
F. QUALITY 
London (Reuter)-Simple laws of physics can explain one of life's oldest and 
most annoying truisms-that a dropped piece of toast always lands butter side 
down-a British physicist said Monday. 
"Toast falling off the breakfast table lands butter side down, because the 
universe is made that way," Robert Matthews, a physicist at Aston University 
in Birmingham, said in a statement-Japan Times. 
Perhaps Professor Matthews will also discover why the rule is, jam tomor-
row, and jam yesterday-but never jam today. 104 
Hegel explains this phenomena in his chapter on Specific Quantity in the 
Greater Logic. He uses the wonderful example of "the bald." 105 The hairy 
103. See generally Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 5. 
104. THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 21 & 28, 1995, at 114. 
105. 
The sudden conversion into a change of quality of a change which was apparently merely 
quantitative had already attracted the attention of the ancients who illustrated in popular 
examples the contradictions arising from ignorance [of the suddenness of changes in quality]; 
they are familiar under the name[] of "the bald" ... The question was asked: does the pulling 
out of a single hair from the head ... produce baldness . . . ? An answer in the negative can be 
given without hesitation since such a removal constitutes only a quantitative difference, a 
difference moreover which is itself quite insignificant; thus a hair .. . is removed and this is 
repeated, only one of them being removed each time in accordance with the answer given. At 
last the qualitative change is revealed; the head ... is bald .... In giving the said answer, 
what was forgotten was not only the repetition, but the fact that the individually insignificant 
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young man who wakes up every morning to see a single hair on his pillow is 
still a hairy man-albeit a worried one. But eventually that inevitable and tragic 
dawn breaks when he looks in the mirror and a bald man stares back. 106 Hegel's 
point is not that this demonstrates that the concepts "hairiness" and "bald-
ness" -or property and no property-are irrational. In his language, these 
dyads are qualitatively different as a logical matter. It is absolutely necessary for 
Hegel's entire philosophical project in The Greater Logic to maintain a strictly 
logical distinction between changes in quality (e.g., from hairiness to baldness) 
and changes in quantity (e.g., from 1 million hairs to 999,999 hairs). 107 The 
relation between quality and quantity is what Hegel calls "measure." The 
sublation of quality and quantity through measure is an essential step in the 
dialectical process, which charts the development from pure being through to 
the absolute idea.108 
Hegel argues that quantity and quality are dialectically related, identical yet 
different. Quantitative changes are gradual; qualitative changes are sudden. 
Something can have more or less of a Hegelian quantity, but it either has or 
does not have Hegelian quality. The Hegelian concept of the identity of identity 
and difference, however, means that quantitative change reveals itself as always 
already becoming qualitative change. 
This means that it is logically necessary, on the one hand, that quantitative 
changes eventually become qualitative changes, yet, on the other hand, there 
can be no fixed point at which the change occurs. This is because (by definition) 
the identification of a specific point of transition is to assign a quality to the 
transition point. This does not solve the logical problem, it just replicates it. We 
have just substituted a different question of qualitative differentiation. 
An example may make this clear. We all intuitively understand that it just 
doesn't work to reword the question asked of the anxious young man standing 
at the mirror, "Am I bald yet?" as "Am I now at the transition point between 
hairy and bald?" Those of us who are confronting middle age recognize that this 
former wording is not a clarification, but an unacceptable attempt to avoid the 
issue through euphemism. Further, to name the transition point "Am I now 
'semi-bald'?" just restates the problem in increasingly painful detail. 
It is, of course, impossible to compress the monumentally complex system of 
The Greater Logic into a few pages of a law review article. 109 It should be 
quantities (like the individually insignificant disbursements from a fortune) add up and the 
total constitutes the qualitative whole, so that finally this whole has vanished; the head is 
bald, the purse is empty. 
HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 335. 
106. Those hairy readers who smile condescendingly at our metaphoric hero's plight may want, 
instead, to contemplate the old, gray, and wrinkled. 
107. Indeed, over one-third of Hegel's Logic is devoted to a discussion of quality, quantity, and their 
relationship. ' 
108. HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61 , at 327. 
109. In this article, I limit my discussion to the relationship of quality and quantity called "mea-
sure." This is not intended as a complete description of the complex and subtle concept of quantity. For 
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sufficient for my very limited purpose simplistically to explain that "quality" to 
Hegel is what he calls "determinate being." This is a concept derived through 
sublation of the logical concept of pure or immediate being. That is, all things 
that exist share the abstract concept of pure immediate being per se-they all 
exist. Quality refers to the specific, affirmative aspect of a thing which distin-
guishes it from other things that exist-i.e., it is the aspect of a thing which is 
not shared; it is that which enables us to tell two "things" apart. For example, it 
is what enables us to understand the following conversation between two 
women at a cocktail party: "I think he's kind of cute." "Which one?" "The 
bald one." 
To put it another way, if being is pure and immediate, then nothing can be 
discerned. As a consequence, Hegel argues that pure being shares a moment of 
identity with pure nothing. 110 In contrast, determinative being (or quality) is the 
concept that something discernable exists. But a quality can only be defined in 
terms of what it is not-it is defined by its own negation in the sense of "this is 
not that." 111 To be bald can only be understood in terms of not being hirsute. 
Determinate being, moreover, by definition, is finite ( otherwise it could not 
be determined). 112 By this I mean that the very concept of determining what 
distinguishes one thing from another implies setting boundaries; separating one 
thing from another. If the thing is on this side of the boundary, it is X; if on the 
other side, it is not-X. 
Quantity is the sublation of quality: Quantity is what results when one 
overcomes quality's finitude. Finitude is quality's dependence on otherness; i.e. 
the sense that a quality can only be understood in terms of what it is not, of 
I 
what is fenced off. Because quantity is the expulsion of otherness, the quantity 
achieved by sublating any one quality is indistinguishable and continuous with 
all other "ones" that similarly result from sublating all other qualities (determi-
nate beings). In other words, qualities are plural, but quantity is unity. By 
definition, there must be many qualities, each separate and distinguishable from 
the others in the sense that the quality of baldness is different from the quality 
of hairiness, or for that matter, the qualities of being hot, sweet, or whatever. In 
contradistinction, the concept of more or less is the same regardless of whether 
we are talking about more of this, or less of that-whether it be the number of 
hairs on a man's head, the temperature, or sweetness. Quantity is, therefore, 
indifferent to quality. 
In simple English, quality is differentiation, quantity is commensuration. 
a succinct description of this journey from pure being to essence-beyond deconstruction, see David G. 
Carlson, The Hegelian Revival in American Legal Discourse, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1062-67 
(1992). 
110. Because immediate being in its purity has no specific content, it is identical to pure nothing. 
HEGEL'S Loo,c, supra note 61, at 82. The relationship between pure being and pure nothing is 
" becoming." Hegel argues that it is this relationship of becoming which sets the dialectic process in 
motion. It is the sublation of the pure being and pure nothing which creates determinate being (quality). 
lll. Id. 
112. See id. at 129. 
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Quality is difference; quantity is identity. The identity of quality and quantity is 
the famous Hegelian doctrine of the identity of identity and difference. Qualities 
are the differences of self from other. Quantity, in contradistinction, is what self 
arid other have in common. Qualitative difference is a matter of is or is not. 
Quantitative difference is a matter of more or less. Quality asks "is it X or Y?" 
Quantity asks "how much Z do X and Y have?", This is why changes in 
quantity are sudden even though changes in quality are gradual. Nevertheless, 
changes in quantity eventually lead to changes in quality. This relationship 
between quality and quantity is called "measure." 
Although not absolutely necessary to the limited argument of this article, it 
may be useful briefly to touch upon how quality underlies the Hegelian/ 
Lacanian concept of freedom because this is the basis of my theory of femi-
nism. To be free, of course, is not to have limits. As just discussed, quality 
(determinate being) can only be understood in terms of its finitude or limit. The 
very concept of any limit, however, necessarily includes within itself the 
concept that there is something beyond the limit. To resort to a spatial analogy, 
quality (determinate being) defines something by fencing it in, and this implies, 
in tum, that something is fenced out. 113 True infinity (an important concept to 
Hegel which is beyond the scope of this article) consists of negating the limit of 
any specific quality. This is my definition of freedom-and the feminine. Let 
me slow down. 
To reiterate, quality is the concept of identifying things in terms of that which 
they are not. It is, therefore, a setting of limits; a building of fences keeping 
some "things" on this side, and some "things" on the other side. If, as I have 
just posited, we can only identify a quality in terms of what it is not, then this 
means that to know the true quality of a thing, we must go beyond its limit. We 
must climb over the fence which proscribes a quality, see what is on the other 
side and then look back. In this sense, Hegel believes that logic itself requires 
that every time_ we confront a limit, we must exceed the limit. 
The banal witticism "rules are made to be broken" is literally true to Hegel. 
The Hegelian paradox is precisely that limitation and finitude create the condi-
tions of freedom and infinity. 114 Freedom and necessity are, therefore, dialecti-
113. For readers familiar with Lacanian psychoanalysis, this is the concept of the Real. The Real is 
the concept of that which cannot be captured in language/law (the "Symbolic" ) and imagery (the 
"Imaginary" ). We experience the Real as that which limits the Symbolic and the Imaginary because it 
pre-exists them. In fact, the Real only exists because the Symbolic and ths: Imaginary exist. That is, 
language/law, the ability to speak and interrelate with other human subjects, requires that we categorize 
and limit things (in a process known as "castration" ). This very process of setting limits presupposes 
something beyond that limir. We call this sense that there is something beyond the limit the "Real." 
The Real, therefore, does not pre-exist the Symbolic and Imaginary, but comes into existence simulta-
neously with them. 
114. Once again, these concepts should sound familiar to Lacanians. Freud posited a portion of the 
psyche called the superego which internalized law, morality, and the ethics. The superego is the 
conscience. The Freudian superego constantly says, "Don't do that, don 't enjoy yourself." Lacan, in 
contradistinction, recognized that the very concept of law presupposes its own transgression. That is, 
one does not forbid that which is impossible, only that which is possible but forbidden. To put it another 
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cally related. Freedom is the lack of limits, yet it is created by limits. Freedom 
is to not be bound by necessity, but limits necessitate that we seek to be free. 
That Hegel recognizes freedom as "the beyond of the limit" as not only a 
logical necessity, but an ethical mandate, is evidenced by the fact that he calls 
the demand to surpass all limits "the ought." 115 
Finally, to clarify terminology used by some of the sources I cite later in this 
article, quality is sometimes called "being in-itself." This expression captures 
the idea that quality is that which makes something what it is (as opposed to 
what it is not). Quality is "fenced in"; enclosed within its own borders. In 
opposition, quantity is "being for itself." This captures the sense that since 
quantity expels otherness it is for itself, not for another. Curiously, therefore, 
quantity (unlike quality) ends up being that aspect of being which is the 
opposite (or negation) of being. By this I mean, quality is the concept that there 
are things that really exist and that we can distinguish one from another because 
they are different in some meaningful way. The concept of quantity, in contradis-
tinction, does not require the existence of anything in particular. It just posits 
that if something did exist and could be measured, it could be described as more 
or less like this or that. Quality is the assertion "this is what I am-not that"; 
quantity is "this is what I'm like-I have some of this and some of that." Both 
are necessary yet insufficient ways of understanding something. 
G. THE MOVEMENT OF SUBLATION 
1. Negation and Preservation 
The common misreading of the dialectic suppresses the preserving aspect of 
sublation beneath its negating aspect. It forgets that at the moment the self is 
negated and becomes identical to the other, it still remains differentiated and 
separate as the self. As property becomes nonproperty, it still always retains the 
notion of property. Nonproperty can only be understood in terms of property-
that which it is not. 
way, if the thing that the law forbids is really impossible, then the law is not really a law but a statement 
of fact. 
Consequently, if the function of the superego is to establish law as law it must make the possibility of 
its own transgression a reality. This means that the Lacanian superego, in fact, constantly shouts "You 
can and must break the law. Enjoy!" 
115. See HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 132-33. Immanuel Kant insisted that impossibility never 
exonerates a person from his ethical duty. Consequently, the Kantian response to the excuse "I can't" is 
the slogan "You can because you must!" (See, for example, SLAVOJ ZJZEK, THE METASTASES OF 
ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 68 (1994), in which Zizek uses a scene from de 
Laclos's Les Liaisons Dangereuses to illustrate this concept.) Hegel, as always, goes a step further than 
Kant in recognizing that it is precisely the impossibility which changes an obligation into a duty. He 
writes, in effect, "You must because you can't!" See also JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES 
LACAN: BOOK VII-THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS I 959-60, at 315-17 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & 
Dennis Porter trans., 1992). 
It is far beyond the scope of this article, but this concept of freedom as the ought-the going beyond 
the limit, is the Lacanian feminist concept of the feminine which I develop in my forthcoming book. 
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note *. 
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This is a crucial point for Hegel. He denies that only the positive has 
determinate characteristics, with the negative being a generic nonbeing. 
[T]here still lingers on the thought of this difference of [nothing] from being, 
namely that the determinate being of nothing does not at all pertain to nothing 
itself, that nothing does not possess an independent being of its own, is not 
being as such. Nothing, it is said, is only the absence of being, darkness thus 
only the absence of light, cold only absence of heat, and so on. And darkness 
only has meaning in relation to the eye, in external comparison with the 
positive factor, light, and similarly cold is only something in our sensation; on 
the other hand, light and heat, like being, are objective, active realities on 
their own account, and are of quite another quality and dignity than this 
negative, than nothing. One can often find it put forward as a weighty 
reflection and an important piece of information that darkness is only absence 
of light, cold only absence of heat. About this acute reflection in this field of 
empirical objects, it can be empirically observed that darkness does in fact 
show itself active in light, determining it to colour and thereby imparting 
visibility to it, since, as was said above, just as little is seen in pure light as in 
pure darkness. Visibility, however, is effected in the eye, and the supposed 
negative has just as much a share in this as the light which is credited with 
being the real, positive factor; similarly, cold makes its presence known in 
water, in our sensations etc., and if we deny it so-called objective reality it is 
not a whit the worse for our doing so. But a further objection would be that 
here, too, as before, it is a negative with a determinate content that is spoken 
of, the argument is not confined to pure nothing, to which being, regarded as 
an empty abstraction, is neither inferior nor superior. But cold, darkness, and 
similar determinate negations are to be taken directly as they are by them-
selves and we shall then see what we have thereby effected in respect of their 
universal determination which has led them to be introduced here. They are 
supposed to be not just nothing but the nothing of light, heat, etc., of 
something determinate, of a content; thus they are a determinate, a contentful, 
nothing if one may so speak. But, as will subsequently appear, a determinate-
ness is itself a negation, and so they are negative nothings; but a negative 
nothing is an affirmative something. 116 
The loss of property is not a mere lack of rights, it is nonproperty-a positive 
taking. 
2. Potentiality and Actuality 
To those who are unfamiliar with the Hegelian dialectic, the concept of 
sublation and the suddenness of changes in quality versus the gradualism of 
changes in quantity might be hard to understand. Some are hampered by having 
I 16. HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 101-02; see also id. at 323 ("At first, then, quantity as such 
appears in opposition to quality; but quantity is itself a quality . . .. But quantity is not only a quality; it 
is the truth of quality itself . ... "). 
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been taught a crude caricature of the dialectic as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis 
whereby the · internal contradistinction of thesis and antithesis are obliterated 
when they are replaced by synthesis. This formula is designed more as a means 
to discredit Karl Marx (who adopted Hegel's method) than to understand 
philosophy. This is how I was introduced to it in high school. 
Others might be hampered by the prejudice in our society that "contradic-
tions" (like negativity) are bad things that can and must be eliminated. Conse-
quently, it is easy to conclude that when Hegel identifies a contradiction in the 
abstract right of property he is making a judgment that property is somehow 
incoherent or bad and in need of replacement. Nothing could be more wrong. In 
the Hegelian dialectic, contradiction can not be bad and it can never be 
destroyed. Contradiction must be resolved, but each resolution necessarily 
creates a new contradiction. As a result, contradiction is not only a logically 
necessary aspect of the world, it is. precisely that aspect of the world that creates 
change and dynamism. 117 
Sublation is a process by which internal contradictions of earlier concepts are 
resolved, but not in the sense of the suppression of difference. The German 
word Aujhebung means, paradoxically, to preserve as well as negate. 
"To sublate" [i.e. "Aujhebung"] has a twofold meaning in [German]: on the 
one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause 
to cease, to put an end to. Even "to preserve" includes a negative element, 
namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an 
existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus 
what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy 
but is not on that account annihilated. 118 
In sublation, the earlier stage is always preserved because it is always a 
necessary moment in the development of the later. To put it in more fashionable 
contemporary terminology, the earlier concept is at one moment always already 
the subsequent concept, but simultaneously the very existence of the later 
concept requires that the earlier concept is not yet the later concept. 
Sublation (i.e., synthesis) can never destroy the differentiation between self 
117. Hegel is particularly critical of philosophers who try to do away with contradiction. 
The solution .. . is transcendental, that is, it consjsts in the assertion of the ideality of space 
and time as forms of intuition-in the sense that the world is in its own self not self-
contradictory, not self-sublating, but that it is only consciousness in its intuition and in the 
relation of intuition to understanding and reason that is a self-contradictory being. It shows an 
excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and then to transfer the 
contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point of fact it 
is spirit which is so strong that it can endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows how 
to resolve it. But the so-called world ... is never and nowhere without contradiction, but it is 
unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to corning-to-be and ceasing-to-be. 
Id. at 237-38. 
ll8. Id. at 107. 
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and other (thesis and antithesis) precisely because sublati~n is the recognition 
that at one moment self and other are the same even when at another moment 
they are truly different. Moreover, the moment of i,dentity is itself different from 
the self-identify of self and other. In other words, in the differentiation of self 
and other, identity is a possibility. It is through sublation that the possibility of 
identity is actualized. But at the same time, however, self and other must remain 
differentiated in order for actualization to remain possible. This is known as the 
"identity of identity and difference." 
I have already suggested how, by definition, for something to be possible it 
must be actualized-the failure of something eventually to become actualized, 
means that it was not, in fact, possible. Something only retroactively becomes 
potential once it has already been fulfilled. This was why the abstract person as 
free will is driven to actualize its potential freedom as concrete freedom. 119 But 
the dialectic works the opposite way as well. The logically later concept cannot 
exist except for the logical necessity of the continuance of the earlier; the earlier 
cannot exist except for the logical necessity of the possibility of the later. The 
later concept is actuality, but the earlier concept is the possibility that allows it 
to come into being. 
To resort to metaphor, the earlier moment in the dialectic is like the founda-
tion for the subsequent edifice. A foundation is dug before the building, but in 
anticipation of the building. The building requires the foundation because one 
cannot remove the foundation after the building is built without causing the 
entire edifice to come crashing down. But the foundation also requires the 
building in the sense that unless the building is subsequently built, it is not a 
foundation, but rather merely a hole in the ground. It becomes a foundation only 
retroactively. Similarly, the legal subject and abstract right are the foundations 
on which the individual citizen and the state will be built. The Hegelian 
dialectic is supposed to be circular. The Philosophy of Right tries to show that if 
one starts with an analysis of the free person, then logic will inevitably lead to 
the concept of the fully developed state. But to a Hegelian this means that if 
one, instead, started with an analysis of the fully developed state, the same logic 
would inevitably lead back to the concept of the free person.120 If autonomy and 
abstract rights are suppressed and subordinated to the state, the state will also 
cease to be. We would be left only with its ruins-tyranny and oppression. Or 
more accurately, we would be able to conclude, retroactively, that it was never, 
in fact, a "state." 
3. Circularity and Retroactivity 
To put it another way, the later stages of sublation are not superior to nor 
more authentic than the earlier ones; they do not "replace" the earlier moments. 
119. That is, freedom is negative and, therefore, mere possibility. Right is the actualization of 
freedom. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 35. 
120. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 5, at 8 I 8; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, 
supra note 5, at 123-27. 
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Each moment of a concept in the dialectic is equally true and authentic. The 
designations "later" and "earlier" do not refer to empirical events that take 
place in time. They are relative positions in a logical process that takes place 
outside of time. This point is important in light of the earlier discussion of the 
structure of The Philosophy of Right, which places the development of the 
abstract relations of property and contract prior to the development of more 
complex relations, including the family. Obviously, this is not empirically the 
case with human beings either individually or collectively. 121 
Hegel, by necessity, presents his analysis in a specific order. He claims, 
however, that the dialectical process is circular. 122 Theoretically, one could start 
at any stage and derive the whole. This is necessary because Hegel tried to 
develop a logic which, unlike Kantian liberalism, did not require an unproven 
presumption. 123 Although he recognized that, as a practical matter, one must 
temporarily start with a presupposition as a working hypothesis, he sought a 
dialectic that would circle back so that the later stages could logically prove the 
hypothesis retroactively. In other words, the dialectic is holistic; each hypoth-
esis is deemed proven by virtue of its place in a coherent whole. 124 
4. Sublation as Quantum Leap 
Because sublation simultaneously maintains the distinction between two 
concepts while creating a unity, the movement of sublation cannot be gradual. It 
is a change in quality, rather than quantity. The change from quantity to quality 
is, to use the language of modern physics, a quantum leap. Hegel explains how 
gradual quantitative change produces the quantum leap of qualitative change: 
Since the quantitative determinateness of anything is thus twofold-namely, it 
is that to which the quality is tied and also that which can be varied without 
affecting the quality-it follows that the destruction of anything which has a 
121. We are all individually born into family or other social relations, and legal property and 
contract rights are relatively modem inventions of bourgeois society. 
122. 
Philosophy forms a circle. It has an initial or immediate point-for it must begin some-
where-a point which is not demonstrated and is not a result. But the starting point of 
philosophy is immediately relative, for it must appear at another end-point as a result. 
Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, 
but is rounded off within itself. 
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 26. "The essential requirement for the science of logic is 
not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within 
itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first." HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 
61, at 71. 
123. This problem is the subject of With What Must the Science Begin?, the introduction to the first 
book of HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 67-78. . 
124. See, e.g., HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 36-37. "The deduction that the will is 
free and of what the will and freedom are .. . is possible only with the context of the whole [of 
philosophy]." HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 71 (alteration in original). 
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measure takes place through the alteration of its quantum. On the one hand 
this destruction appears as unexpected, in so far as the quantum can be 
changed without altering the measure and the quality of the thing; but on the 
other hand, it is made into something quite easy to understand through the 
idea of gradualness. The reason why such ready use is made of this category 
to render conceivable or to explain the disappearance of a quality or of 
something, is that it seems to make it possible almost to watch the disappear-
ing with one's eyes, because quantum is posited as the external limit which is 
by its nature alterable, and so alteration (of quantum only) requires no 
explanation. But in fact nothing is explained thereby; the alteration is at the 
same time essentially the transition of one quality into another, or the more 
abstract transition of an existence into a negation of the existence; this implies 
another determination than that of gradualness which is only a decrease or an 
increase and is a one-sided holding fast to quantity. 125 
Nevertheless, it is a common logical error to conclude that because the qualita-
tive change takes place through quantitative changes the qualitative change is 
itself gradual. We make this mistake not because the former follows from the 
latter as a logical matter, but because it is intuitively simple. 
Since the progress from one quality [to another] is in an uninterrupted 
continuity of the quantity, the ratios which approach a specifying point are, 
quantitatively considered, only distinguished by a more and a less. From this 
side, the alteration is gradual. But the gradualness concerns merely the 
external side of the alteration, not its qualitative aspect; the preceding quantita-
tive relation which is infinitely near the following one is still a different 
qualitative existence. On the qualitative side, therefore, the gradual, merely 
quantitative progress which is not in itself a limit, is absolutely interrupted; 
the new quality in its merely quantitative relationship is, relatively to the 
vanishing quality, an indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is 
therefore a leap; both are posited as completely external to each other. People 
fondly try to make an alteration comprehensible by means of the gradualness 
of the transition; but the truth is that gradualness is an alteration which is 
merely indifferent, the opposite of qualitative change. 126 
One might be tempted to argue that if, as Hegel says, changes in quality are 
sudden not gradual, then one should be able to identify the exact point when the 
change occurs. Does not this suggest that the takings paradox should be easily 
solvable? This is, once again, a serious misunderstanding of sublation. 
Slavoj Zizek, a philosopher who insists on the close interrelationship between 
Hegelian theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis, gives a characteristically brilliant 
account of why we can never identify the moment of sublation. The specific 
125. HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra note 61, at 334-35. 
126. Id. at 368. 
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examples he uses are Hegel's descriptions of the movements from conscious-
ness into self-consciousness, and from "in-itself" to "for-itself," but it can be 
generalized to all sublations. 
Hegel's point is, again, that consciousness always-already is self-conscious-
ness .... 
The passage of consciousness to self-consciousness thus involves a kind of 
failed encounter: at the very moment when consciousness endeavors to 
establish itself as "full" consciousness •Of its object, when it endeavors to pass 
from the confused foreboding of its content to its clear representation, it 
suddenly finds itself within self-consciousness-that is to say, it finds itself 
compelled to perform an act of reflection, and to take note of its own activity 
as opposed to the object. Therein resides the paradox of the couple of 
"in-itself" and "for-itself": we are dealing here with the passage from "not 
yet" to "always-already." In "in-itself," the consciousness ( of an object) is 
not yet fully realized, it remains a confused anticipation of itself; whereas in 
"for-itself" consciousness is in a way already passed over, the full comprehen-
sion of the object is again blurred by the awareness of the subject's own 
activity that simultaneously renders possible and prevents access to the object. 
In short, consciousness is like the tortoise in Lacan's reading of the paradox of 
Achilles and the tortoise-Achilles can easily outrun the tortoise, yet cannot 
catch up with her. 127 
Zizek refers to Lacan's comparison of his notion of fantasy-which reflects a 
Hegelian sublative leap-to Zeno's famous paradoxes. 128 In a Lacanian reading, 
Zeno did not merely intend to make the negative point that the reasoning of his 
teacher, Parmenides, led to the conclusion that Achilles could never catch up to 
a tortoise who is given a head start. Rather, Zeno was a brilliant satirist. He 
eruditely combined allusions to the tragic race to the death between Achilles 
127. ZIZEK, supra note 115, at 188-89. 
· 128. Zeno's paradoxes were designed to demonstrate the theory of his teacher, Parmenides, "that 
reality is one, immutable, and unchanging; and all plurality, change and motion are mere illusions." 
DoUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GoLDEN BRAID 29-32 (1979). In the 
most famous paradox, Zeno posited a race between the proverbially slow tortoise and the legendary 
hero Achilles, the fleetest of all mortals. The paradox argues that if the tortoise is given a head start, 
then it is logically impossible for Achilles to catch up. Whenever Achilles comes to the place where the 
tortoise once was, the tortoise will have already moved further on. 
And now the Tortoise is but a single rod ahead of Achilles. Within only a moment, Achilles 
has attained that spot. . .. Yet in that short moment, the Tortoise has managed to advance a 
slight amount. In a flash, Achilles covers that distance, too .. .. But in that very short flash, 
the Tortoise has managed to inch ahead by ever so little, and so Achilles is still behind. Now 
you see that in order for Achilles to catch the Tortoise, the game of "try-to-catch-me" will 
have to be played an INFINITE number of times-and therefore Achilles can NEVER catch up 
with the Tortoise! 
Id. at 32. This common notion of infinity (i.e. , an unending string of something, in this case of 
increasingly smaller subdivisions) is what Hegel called a bad or spurious infinity. HEGEL'S LOGIC, supra 
note 61 , at 139-40. It is to be contrasted with the "true" infinity of "the beyond of the limit," which I 
discuss supra in text accompanying note 115. 
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and Hector in The Iliad with the comic race between the hare and the tortoise in 
Aesop's fable in order to make a profound philosophical point. Specifically, 
Zeno was referring to Homer's description of the fatal race: 
As in a dream, the pursuer never succeeds in catching up with the fugitive 
whom he is after, and the fugitive likewise cannot ever clearly escape his 
pursuer; so Achilles that day did not succeed in attaining Hector, and Hector 
was not able to escape him definitely.129 
As explicated by Zizek: 
[The] point is not that Achilles could not overtake Hector (or the tortoise)-
since he is faster than Hector, he can easily leave him behind-but rather that 
he cannot attain him: Hector is always too fast or too slow ... . The libidinal 
economy of the case of Achilles and the tortoise is here made clear: the 
paradox stages the relation of the subject to the object-cause of its desire, 
which can never be attained. The object-cause is always missed; all we can do 
is encircle it. In short, the topology of this paradox of Zeno is the paradoxical · 
topology of the object of desire that eludes our grasp no matter what we do to 
attain it. 130 
In other words, it is not merely empirically difficult, it is logically impossible 
to identify the exact moment when quantitative change becomes qualitative 
change-that is, when it is no longer adequate to say there is more or less of 
129. HOMER, THE ILIAD, Book XXII, II. 199-200, quoted in SLAVOJ ZIZEK, LooKING AWRY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 4 (1992). 
In the climax of The Iliad, the petulant Achaean hero, Achilles, finally joins the battle and accepts the 
challenge of the Trojan champion, Hector. The scene that follows seems startlingly postmodern in its 
juxtaposition of tragedy and farce and its use of the surrealistic dream imagery. Indeed, the farcical 
element of the story increases our sense of Hector's tragedy. 
For 21 books, the epic seemed to have been building up to a glorious duel. Instead, Homer surprises 
us with slapstick. Hector, who up to now has been presented as the perfect warrior, panics and flees in 
terror while trying to convince himself that this was a clever diversionary tactic to tire Achilles out. 
Achilles chases Hector around the great walls of Troy three times before finally catching and killing 
him. 
As every aficionado of Bugs Bunny knows, Aesop's hare should have easily beat the tortoise in the 
race, but lost because of his own overconfidence. Similarly, Achilles, the fleetest of all mortals, should, 
but never does, beat the tortoise in Zeno's race. Similarly, according to Homer, although Achilles does 
finally overtake Hector, it takes so long that Achilles and Hector feel that they are living the nightmare 
in which one runs without moving. As in Zeno's paradox, the race seems to go on forever as Hector 
always moves away just as Achilles approaches. 
Lewis Carroll, a mathematician by profession, recalls Zeno in the famous scene in Through the 
Looking Glass in which Alice runs and runs and runs only to find that she has never moved from the 
place she started. The Red Queen explains that "it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same 
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that. " CARROLL, supra 
note 1, at 196-97. 
Jean-Claude Milner argues that each of Zeno's other paradoxes similarly juxtapose a popular comic 
image with a familiar tragic one. See JEAN-CLAUDE MILNER, DETECTIONS FICTIVES 45-71 (1985). 
130. Id. 
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something, and we must instead conclude that there has been a change of 
something into something else. We are always positioned either at the point 
where the change (i.e., in quality) has not occurred (when, in Lacanian terminol-
ogy, it is the "not yet"), or after it has occurred (when it is "always already"), 
but never at the point of the transition itself because there is no such point. 
In the words of the White Queen, in sublation, it is always jam yesterday and 
jam tomorrow, but never jam to-day. 131 
Ill. TAKINGS AND FREEDOM 
A. FREEDOM 
But judges are forced to act "to-day." 132 Hegel's abstract logic is impeccable, 
but Hegel always refuses to give the type of pragmatic advice needed by 
judges. 133 How could he? He is trying to explain the nature of freedom-if he 
told us what to do, we would not be free. 
On the one hand, there is a logically and intuitively recognizable qualitative 
distinction between property and no property. Moreover, a quantitative change 
in how much property one has is logically distinct from a qualitative change of 
having property to not having property. On the other hand, a quantitative 
diminution of property eventually becomes a qualitative change from property 
to no property. This is inherent in the logical nature of the concepts of quality 
and quantity. The problem in takings jurisprudence is that a declaration that a 
taking has occurred is precisely a judgment that the change of quantity in 
property has passed over into a change in quality. The relationship between 
possibility and actuality is traumatic.134 Also, according to Hegel, there is no 
logical way of identifying the moment when this occurs, because it either has 
131. 
In other words, is not a kind of leap from "not-yet" to "always-already" constitutive of the 
Hegelian dialectics: we endeavor to approach the Goal . . . when, all of a sudden, we establish 
that all the time we were already there? Is not the crucial shift in a dialectical process the 
reversal of anticipation-not into its fulfillment, but-into retroaction? . . . [T]he fulfillment 
never occurs in the Present .... 
SLAVOJ ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 156 
(1994) [hereinafter ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE]. 
132. This is the problem explored by Jacques Derrida in The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990). 
133. See Hyland, supra note 59. 
134. 
The ontological background of this leap from "not-yet" to "always-already" is a kind of 
"trading of places" between possibility and actuality: possibility itself, in its very opposition 
to actuality, possesses an actuality of its own. . . . [T]here is always something traumatic 
about the raw factuality of what we encounter as "actual"; actuality is always marked by an 
indelible brand of the (real as) "impossible." The shift from actuality to possibility, the 
suspension of actuality through inquiry into its possibility, is therefore ultimately an endeavor 
to avoid the trauma of the real. 
ZIZEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 131, at 157. 
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not yet occurred, or it has always already occurred. This problem is why 
pragmatism is always the necessary corollary to Hegelian idealism. 135 
The organization of our society is in large part based on a market economy 
and the institution of private property, which requires that we distinguish 
between property and no property. Consequently, we must make a pragmatic 
decision as to when we will declare that the dialectical passing of quantity into 
quality has occurred. To Hegel, pragmatic decisions cannot be decided by logic, 
but only by pragmatic reasoning. This can only be done by positive law 
(whether in the form of custom, judicial decision, legislation or whatever). This 
is probably why takings cases seem so illogical and "subjective." From a 
Hegelian perspective, this is necessarily true. 
It is also why, from a Hegelian perspective, the observation that property is 
both logically prior to positive law (in that it is a necessary moment in the 
development of subjectivity and the actualization of human freedom), yet 
simultaneously subject to the defining restraints of positive law, is not a 
troublesome logical contradiction (as it is in the classical liberalism embodied in 
the Constitution). Most important, it suggests that, although property is neces-
sary for the actualization of human freedom, property is ill-suited for the role 
traditionally ascribed to it by liberal philosophies to "serve[] ... in the office of 
a wall, or as a moat defensive to a house," 136 protecting private rights from 
government oppression. 
B. TOTALITARIANISM 
Because liberalism is based on the presumption of free, self-actuating, autono-
mous individuals pre-existing in some hypothesized state of nature, society and 
the state are defined as problems. They need to be justified in light of the 
individual's pre-existing natural rights and liberties. As we have seen, property 
and the Takings Clause are traditionally seen as ways of protecting the free 
individual from the state. 
In contrast, Hegel believed that the presumption of the free individual is 
every bit as problematic as the justification of society or government. Although 
Hegel contingently started his political analysis in The Philosophy of Right with 
the Kantian-liberal concept of the abstract free person (self-consciousness as 
free will), he argued that the very internal logic of this concept means that the 
person cannot actualize the potential freedom that is the essence of personhood 
135. Hegel recognized this fact. He just thought that philosophy had nothing to add to pragmatism. 
When Plato recommended that nursemaids should rock babies to keep them from crying, he had left 
philosophy and entered prudence. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 6, at 21. " A further word 
on the subject of issuing instructions on how the world ought to be: philosophy at any rate always 
comes too late to perform this function." Id. at 81. This is partly an issue of terminology. American 
pragmatists think of their theories as a branch of philosophy. Hegel's point is to distinguish that which 
can be logically demonstrated (what he calls philosophy) from that which isn' t but may be adopted for 
good reasons. This is, of course, similar to the Popper-Kuhn distinction between science and common 
sense, which is merely supposed to distinguish, not denigrate, the latter. 
136. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II act 2, SC . I. 
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except in the complex social relations of the family, civil society, and the state. 
Rights such as property are not pre-existing or natural, but are human creations. 
This does not, however, mean that they are unauthentic or inessential. They are 
logically necessary for the actualization of potential freedom. 
It is tempting to misinterpret Hegel as justifying the totalitarian state to which 
individualism, freedom, and property are totally subordinated. This is based, 
once again, upon the usual misreading of sublation. Although the individual 
citizen in the developed state governed by ethical life is the last stage of the 
development of man and society discussed in The Philosophy of Right, this 
cannot mean that the state replaces the logically earlier institution of civil 
society or that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) replaces the earlier relationships of 
morality and abstract right. To reiterate, sublation requires that the logically 
earlier stages always remain present and intact as the building blocks of the 
logically later stages. If the freedom of man as abstract person, or the property 
rights of man as legal subject were infringed, then the ethical life of man as 
individual in the state (which is the eventual result of sublation of these other 
stages) would cease to exist. 
Consequently, Hegel believed that it is absolutely crucial to the state's own 
existence that it recognize and protect individual freedom and property rights. 
One must always remain critically aware, however, that even if the abstract 
person and the developed state mutually require each other as a theoretical 
matter, the interests of the state and the person will frequently conflict as an 
empirical matter. Not all empirical governmental institutions qualify as Hege-
lian "states." Rather, they constitute more or less adequate manifestations of the 
notion of "state." Nevertheless, unlimited individual property rights would be 
self-defeating because they would impede complete actualization of freedom of 
the person, which requires the existence of civil society and the state. 
The point for takings law is that although society demands both individualis-
tic property rights and some communitarian limits on property rights, there is no 
logical algorithm that can determine the proper balance between the two. As we 
have discussed, the dialectical quantum leap between property and no property 
is simultaneously both not yet and always already from a logical standpoint. 
Since property is not a pre-existing natural right, but a human creation (albeit a 
necessary one), its limits can only be determined by humans. 
Citizens, therefore, must be in a state of constant diligence, watching the 
government so that it does not (self-defeatingly) crush human freedom. This is 
not merely consistent with, but required by, the Hegelian concept of actualized 
freedom. Freedom cannot be actualized by passively submitting to a pre-
existing Symbolic order. It requires a constant positive affirmation of its exis-
tence through the exercise of subjectivity through the active creation of law. 
Hegel leaves this actualization of law as abstract right to positive law 
(Gesetz). As I have said, this can only be promulgated in the civil society and 
state on the basis of morality and ethical life. We must also consider who should 
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make this pragmatic decision-the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, or 
the "people" (through constitutional amendment)? 
The specific balance of rights will, by definition, be empirical and not logical. 
This is because as the actualization of freedom it will have to contain a purely 
subjective moment. If our actions were logically predetermined, then we would 
not be free. It will always, therefore, have an unsatisfyingly ad hoc or arbitrary 
aspect to it. There is no way around this. As Zizek said, the fundamental thesis 
of Hegel is that the human condition is a failed encounter by definition. But it is 
precisely this "failure" or incompleteness that leaves a space, an opening, 
through which humans can and must constantly seek to actualize our freedom 
and subjectivity by always exceeding our limits. 
IV. BELIEVE THE IMPOSSIBLE 
Alice laughed. "There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe 
impossible things." 
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was 
your age I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why sometimes I've believed 
as many as six impossible things before breakfast . . . . " 137 
Hegelian freedom is "the ought": the ethical and logical necessity of transcend~ 
ing the limit. According to sublative logic, it is always already and not yet. But 
it is never now. We can bear the deprivation of jam today only because of 
memories of jam yesterday, and the self-confidence that we will win jam 
tomorrow. Alice saw the White Queen's paradox as the impossible and she 
could not believe it. The White Queen understood that it followed from "living 
backward"-the retroactive logic of the dialectic. Of course Alice is only a 
child; she sees the White Queen as befuddled. But it is precisely the White 
Queen's understanding of, and belief in, the impossible that makes her sover-
eign and free. 
137. CARROLL, supra note I, at 238 . 
